The Populist Right, the Working Class, and the Changing Face of Class Politics

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Introduction

To many, the transformation of West European party systems since the 1970s and 1980s was seen as evidence that the era of cleavage based politics was over. The rise of identity politics was interpreted not only as a result of the waning of the traditional class and religious cleavages, but as evidence for a new era in which political preferences de-coupled from social structure began to shape voting behavior. It was assumed that voters were "beginning to choose" parties for their policy propositions, the quality of their personnel, or based on their value preferences. The more recent successes of the extreme populist right once again were taken to indicate that anti-establishment populist mobilization was cutting across class alignments. From this point of view, the by now well-established finding that the working class is over-represented in the extreme populist right's electorate came unexpected.

While a host of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the propensity of parts of the working class to support the extreme right, the phenomenon still awaits a theoretical explanation and a systematic empirical test of the rivaling theses. In this chapter, we review

the explanations that have been put forward and test whether economic grievances or cultural world-views are better in explaining the phenomenon. Both are related to the processes of modernization and globalization, which have a cultural, as well as an economic component. We argue that the changing nature of conflicts in West European party systems is crucial in explaining the shift of the manual working class to the extreme right. In particular, the dual transformation of political space has resulted in a new cultural divide that plays a pivotal role in explaining the extreme populist right's appeal for the working class. Preferences along this divide are structured by education and by the experiences individuals make at their workplace, either making them more open to cultural liberalism, or leading them to endorse a anti-universalistic counter-model of community that is based on the exclusion of immigrants.

In conceptual terms, we make an innovative contribution by focusing both on the individual-level characteristics accounting for participation in elections, as well as on those explaining the choice of extreme right-wing populist parties. Using Heckman selection models, we show that the losers of economic modernization actually abstain from voting, while those uncomfortable with cultural modernity support the extreme populist right. Even if we control for political preferences and a number of other factors, however, the over-representation of blue collar workers in the extreme right's electorate persists. The working class by now appears firmly rooted in this segment of the electorate. While not being the social segment worst-off in post-industrial society, it has experienced a relative decline as compared to the postwar decades, making it receptive to the culturalist appeal of the extreme right.

These findings beg the question how individuals with similar political preferences vote in countries where extreme right-wing populist parties are absent. In a final step, we tackle this question. We show that not voting is the preferred option of anti-universalistic or authoritarian segments of the working class where an extreme right option is missing. Thus, the capacity of

the mainstream parties to rally this electorate appears limited even in those party systems not facing an extreme right challenger.

The analysis is based on survey data from thirteen West European countries, six of which feature sizable extreme right-wing populist parties, while these parties failed to achieve an electoral breakthrough in seven others, the Greek LAOS and the Swedish Democrats having been on the verge of breaking through. We start with the discussion of the continued relevance of social class in West European politics and lay out our account of the formation of a new cultural divide. We then discuss various explanations that may account for the propensity of the working class to support the extreme right, and include measures for these hypotheses in our statistical models. The empirical part of this chapter is structured as follows. In a first step, we look at the class basis of the extreme populist right and analyze to which degree the propensity of certain occupational classes to support these parties is explained by education and preferences along the economic and cultural divides. We also take into account the factors explaining political participation. We then take a closer look at voting choices *within* the working class and try to discern the motives that push voters to vote for the extreme populist right, rather than other parties. Finally, we analyze the vote of those individuals within the working class that share the individual-level characteristics of those supporting populist right parties in the countries where these are present, but lack such an option in their own party system.

The Transformation of Cultural Conflicts

In the aftermath of 1968, politics was shaken by New Social Movements that politicized issues relating to societal values and lifestyles, rather than the more traditional distributional

or religious conflicts. As political parties responded to the progressive demands of these movements, a two-dimensional structure of conflicts became discernible in Western European party systems (Kitschelt 1994). Cutting across the "old" distributional axis, a cultural line of conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values came to structure the attitudes of voters and the positions of parties. On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism gave rise to the establishment of Green parties and a transformation of Social democratic parties early in the 1980s. These parties attracted an increasing number of voters from the middle class, especially among certain of its constituencies such so-called social-cultural professionals. As a result, a new divide within the middle class emerged that was rooted in different work logics, the interpersonal logic resulting in the endorsement of libertarian or universalistic values, while employees in hierarchical settings developed or retained more authoritarian values (Kriesi 1989, 1993, 1998; Müller 1999). Thus, while some have taken the new saliency of cultural conflicts to mark the end of cleavage-based politics (e.g., Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984; Franklin et al. 1992), these analyses showed that political conflict remained anchored in an evolving class structure.

While the counter-reaction against the New Left was delayed for at least a decade, new parties of the extreme populist right emerged in the 1980s and the 1990s in many West European countries (Ignazi 1992, 2003; Minkenberg 2000).[1] By developing their own, traditional-communitarian conception of community, they came to challenge the New Left's universalistic values (Bornschier 2010a, 2010b). This novel ideology helped parties to foster the emergence of a collective identity among the losers of the processes of modernization and accelerating globalization. Consequently, they were able to mobilize what in the 1980s had still been a diffuse anti-universalistic potential, as shown by Sacchi (1998). The politicization

[1] We refer to the these parties as extreme populist right (or extreme right for short) with reference to their extreme position along the new cultural dimension, following Ignazi's (1992, 2003) usage of the term. This does not imply that extreme right parties strive to overturn democracy. Furthermore, extreme populist right parties are characterized by an anti-establishment discourse and a hierarchical internal structure (for a more detailed discussion, see Bornschier 2010a: 33-36).

of opposition against immigration and European integration, as well as the rejection of the cultural liberalism defended by the New Left, then, constituted the driving force of a second transformation of West European party systems in the late 1980s and in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).

The populist anti-establishment character of the extreme right's mobilization at first appeared to support the more general claim that politics was loosing its foundation in social class, as perhaps put most boldly by Kingston (2000), for whom a "classless society" had emerged. Early on, however, Betz (1994, 2004) assembled evidence for the "proletarianization" of the right-wing populist challengers' support base. Heavy reliance on blue collar support was initially deemed characteristic only of certain exponents of this party family by Kitschelt and McGann (1995). By now, there is ample evidence to show that the working class has become the core clientele of parties such as the French Front National, the Austrian FPÖ, the Progress Party in Norway, the Danish People's Party, and the Belgian Flaams Blok or Flaams Belang (Betz 2001; Bornschier 2010a; Bjørklund and Andersen 2002; Mayer 2002; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007; Oesch 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2010; Perrineau 1997; Plasser and Ulram 2000; Swyngedouw 1998).

What accounts for the propensity of the manual working class to support the extreme populist right? In what follows, we review the hypotheses that have been advanced in the literature, related either to economic, or to cultural mechanisms. Our own work on the joint processes of modernization and globalization and the resulting new groups of "winners" and "losers", has highlighted both economic and cultural processes (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). For the present purposes, we discuss the economic and cultural components separately. In addition, it is worth noting an indirect mechanism that tips the balance from economic in favor of cultural mechanisms: By de-politicizing economic policy-making at the national level, European integration and globalization have enhanced the saliency of the cultural

dimension of conflict. By weakening alignments along the economic dimension, then, these processes have opened the way for political realignments.

The Working Class and the Extreme Populist Right

Economic explanations

Economic modernization losers. In this perspective, the increasing competition engendered by processes of economic modernization and globalization result in new social divisions (Esping-Andersen 1999; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Economic marginalization makes voters opt for the extreme right to voice their discontent and to exclude immigrants, either as scapegoats or because they are blamed for this constituency's difficulties in the labor market (e.g., Betz 1994, 2004; Luebbers et al. 2002). Furthermore, they rely on extreme right parties to voice their opposition to European integration. In a pioneering analysis, Mughan et al. (2003) show that job insecurity explained the vote for the Australian One Nation Party. Concerning the class correlates of the modernization loser hypothesis, low-skilled service workers are clearly the most disadvantaged class in terms of income and promotion chances (Oesch 2006: 95-105). From an economic perspective, we would thus expect the service proletariat to constitute a core element of the populist right's electorate, together with the unskilled manual working class (or routine operatives). Members of the *skilled* manual working class, on the other hand, are not the most disadvantaged segment of post-industrial society, at least in terms of their absolute standard of living (Oesch 2006: 95-105). Thus, the propensity of skilled workers to support the extreme populist right must be explained in terms of a *relative* decline of this class, making skilled manual workers a core segment of cultural modernization losers, as we argue below.

Economic sector. Kitschelt (1994; with McGann 1995: 6) has argued that in postindustrial capitalism, employees in internationally competitive sectors are reluctant to endorse further redistributive measures and instead support market flexibility. If proved correct, this hypothesis would account for the over-representation of skilled workers, rather than routine operatives, in the extreme populist right's electorate. A division in economic preferences should thus be discernible, explaining why parts of the working class defect the left and support an extreme right party.[2] On the other hand, Walter (2010) argues that workers in more internationalized sectors are likely to opt for economic redistribution to reduce risk, making them more likely to support state interventionist policies and hence vote for leftist parties.

Cultural explanations

Cultural modernization losers. Individuals who disapprove the universalistic norms that have become more widespread and also politically consequential in the past decades, have clearly lost in cultural terms. To a substantial degree, the New Social Movements have been successful in triggering social change, by advancing women's and gay rights, as well as the recognition of difference and the free choice of lifestyles. They have also introduced a global perspective in thinking about development and environmental protection. For those segments of society that shared the social conservatism characteristic of the immediate postwar decades, social change thus implied a fundamental loss of certainty and the withering of a "golden age", when their individual norms were in tune with those in society.

In part, the disenchantment of the working class with the left is triggered by those Social Democratic or Socialist parties that underwent a New Left transformation. Certainly, due to the presence of more than one dimension of conflict, large parts of the working class had not voted for the left as early as the 1950s or 1960s, especially in continental Europe (Bartolini

[2] More recently, McGann and Kitschelt (2005) recognize that this mechanism may have worked only in the early phase of the extreme right's rise, as most of these parties have watered down their neo-liberal credentials.

2000: 497). However, the New Left's emphasis on universalistic values, along with its later emphasis on the constraints of globalization, and the fact that it no longer issues class-specific appeals (see also Goldthorpe 2002: 15–20), are likely to have eroded its support in the working class. Indeed, the cultural liberalism it advocates is diametrically opposed to the preferences of this constituency. The Social Democrats' new core constituency, the socio-cultural professionals, have political preferences that differ starkly from those of the manual working class in cultural, although not in economic terms (Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2010).

To be sure, conservative parties have traditionally defended a more rigid social order, as well as national sovereignty and traditional moral values. Yet, not even Christian Democracy has wholeheartedly opposed the societal trends of the past decades (see Frey 2009). Thus, rallying the anti-universalistic potential present throughout the advanced industrial world (see Sacchi 1998) required the emergence of a new actor with a novel political ideology. By adopting a discourse that meshes opposition against the diluting of the established national community due to immigration with resistance against cultural liberalism and European integration, the extreme populist right succeeded in seizing this potential. However, the saliency of the new cultural conflict for an individual voter will depend on how rooted he or she remains in established cleavages, which determine the space for the extreme right. We therefore test whether leftist economic preferences and religiosity dampen the propensity of individuals to support the extreme right.

In social structural terms, the cultural potential is shaped by a number of variables. While social class impinges both on cultural and economic preference formation, and will be discussed in more detail in the next section, we focus here on education and gender.

Education. The origins of the value change triggering the dual transformation of political space lie in the expansion of higher education and the subsequent diffusion of universalistic

values (Allardt 1968; Kriesi 1999; Stubager 2008; Bornschier 2010a). Education has a "liberalizing effect" in contributing to cultural tolerance and openness, and it provides the cognitive and language skills that give access to other cultures. Individuals with low levels of education, on the other hand, are usually less tolerant and do not have the resources to communicate with foreigners or to "understand" other cultures (Lipset 1960; Grunberg and Schweisguth 1990: 54, 1997a: 155-59, 168; Quillian 1995; Sniderman et al. 2000: 84, Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). Stubager (2008) provides evidence for the socializing effect of education that instills universalistic values, and even shows that social groups defined by levels of education exhibit some degree of collective identity, perceiving an antagonism with one another in terms of interests (Stubager 2009). Education is also likely to influence attitudes regarding supra-national integration and political globalization: Early on, Inglehart (1977) conceived the ability to relate to a supra-national political community as conditional on a process of "cognitive mobilization". In short, education is strongly related to some of the key issues relating to the new cultural conflict.

Gender. In a number of ways, men have lost their privileged societal role in the past decades. The women's movement has increases the autonomy of women, for example in terms of the liberalization of abortion and divorce. Furthermore, universalistic reforms in the welfare state have decoupled provisions from the male breadwinner (Häusermann 2010, Palier 2010). The rise of female employment and the advent of the service economy have led to a loss of prestige of male dominated occupations, above all of the blue collar working class. Thus, various authors have interpreted the over-representation of men in the extreme populist right's support base as an expression of a troubled male identity (Perrineau 1997: 105-7, Mayer 2002: 133-138, Betz 2004: Ch. 4).

Working class culture and milieu

Finally, organizational penetration and socialization in the working class milieu may play a role in explaining why certain members of the blue collar working class support the extreme populist right, while others do not. The literature has tended to view individuals rooted in the working class milieu as the core constituency of the left (e.g., Knutsen 2006) and to some degree insulated from the appeals of the extreme right. On the other hand, detailed analyses of the organizational networks of the Front National cast doubts on whether this is still the case. Perrineau (1997: 46-7) shows that the Front National is firmly rooted in the working class by means of a number of sector-specific unions, which form part of a tightly knitted nationalist counter-culture reminiscent of the Communist party in its early years. Mayer (2002) provides evidence that workers with working class parents and friends are especially prone to vote for the Front National.

The empirical analysis will focus on union membership, working class family background and age. In terms of *union membership,* we expect the union movement to remain predominantly anchored on the left, thus containing the propensity of workers to vote for the extreme right. On the other hand, controlling for union membership, coming from a *working class family* should no longer dampen support for the extreme right, given the strength these parties have reached in the working class. Finally, if alignments between cleavage groups and political parties to be altered primarily by generational replacement, rather than by shifts in party choice (Bornschier 2010a), then *age* should have an effect: younger working class members should be more likely to opt for the extreme populist right than older members.

Data and Operationalization

The analyses are based on the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS), with fieldwork being conducted between fall 2008 and spring 2009. Because our hypotheses are specific to countries that experienced the dual transformation of political space described above, the analysis is restricted to the fourteen West European countries covered by the survey. In a first step, we focus on those countries with successful extreme populist right parties. We use an inclusive definition and exclude from this group only those parties that Ignazi (2002, 2003) has labeled as proponents of the "old" or "traditional" extreme right, which adhere to overt racism and distrust democracy. Although there are differences within the resulting group of parties (see Mudde 2007) most of them practice an "ethno-pluralist" discourse (Betz 2004, Bornschier 2010a). The Swiss and the Danish People's Parties, the True Finns, the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and the Norwegian Progress Party are the core exponents of this party family. We have also grouped some smaller formations in the same countries in this category in order to maximize the number of observations. If anything, using an inclusive definition of the extreme right amounts to a tougher test of our hypotheses than using a more narrow boundaries. We exclude Greece and Sweden from this group due to a limited number of members of the working class who voted for LAOS or Swedish Democrats. Unfortunately, Austria is not featured in the fourth round of the ESS. The analysis of the countries lacking an extreme populist right party includes Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. To identify vote choice, we use the recall question pertaining to the last national election and combine it with the party preference of those who declare not having participated in the last elections. For the analyses pertaining to participation, both those who declare not

having voted, as well as those who could not recall their vote choice are considered to be non-voters.

Social class

To measure social class, we draw on the 8-class schema developed by Oesch (2006). The class schema has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension accounts of stratification that focus on skills and income, whereas the horizontal differentiation is captures different work logics that result in diverging political preferences (see also Oesch, this volume). More specific hypotheses regarding the preferences of social classes are presented below. Due to our specific interest in the working class, we also distinguish between skilled workers and routine operatives as the higher and the lower blue-collar segment, respectively, by drawing on the original 16-class variant of the schema. The operationalization follows Oesch (2006: 222-224). We thus distinguish the following nine classes, situated in four work-logics: *Self-employed:* (1) Self-employed professionals and large employers; (2) Small business owners. *Organizational work-logic:* (3) (Associate) managers and administrators; (4) Office clerks. *Technical work-logic:* (5) Technical professionals and technicians; (6) Skilled production workers; (7) Routine operatives. *Interpersonal work-logic:* (8) Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals; (9) Service workers.

In making more specific predictions for the propensity of specific social groups to support the populist right, we focus on the lower segment within each work logic. Due to their underprivileged status, these groups are more likely than others to support the extreme populist right both for cultural and for economic reasons (due to low levels of education and income, respectively). The middle classes, on the other hand, represent the winners of modernization and globalization, and are thus not particularly likely to vote for the extreme

right. We know, however, that socio-cultural specialists, the core electorate of the New Left, share a particularly strong aversion for the extreme right (see Oesch in this volume).

Among the classes most likely to support the extreme right, *small business owners* have long been considered a potential for these parties (Lipset 1960: Ch. 5, Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Although perhaps not most touched by economic modernization and globalization, low levels of education make the so-called petty bourgeoisie particularly receptive for the particularistic and traditionalist stances of the populist right. Because their preferences are likely to be market-friendly, rather than state interventionist, they face no trade-off when it comes to voting for a right-wing party. Comparatively low levels of formal education characterize *routine operatives,* as well as large parts of the *skilled production workers.* This makes the manual working class as a whole relatively receptive to the traditionalist-communitarian ideology of the populist right. Furthermore, in terms of increasing competition, both groups are strongly affected by economic modernization and structural change. Although the skilled working class is not particularly bad-off in terms of pay (Oesch 2006), its members stand to lose as compared to the golden age of industrial welfare capitalism, as we have argued. To the degree that their attachment to the left and to religious parties have weakened, members of the manual working class thus become a promising target for identity-based appeals. In fact, drawing on the Habermasian theory of modernization, Sacchi (1998) argues that this segment's early integration into market processes makes its members develop anti-statist attitudes, rather than hostility towards the market. In terms of pay, routine operatives could be considered the core potential for the extreme populist right, but on the other hand, low levels of education and political sophistication could also induce them to abstain from voting.

Service workers are most underprivileged in terms of pay (Oesch 2006) and are characterized by low levels of education. This class constitutes a core potential for the

populist right, but low levels of political interest might prevent its members from participating in politics. Finally, although *office clerks* represent the lower-class element within the organizational work logic, they are not particularly bad off in terms of pay and education. We have no strong expectations regarding the political preferences of this group.

Other variables

Because we are interested in the effects of economic marginalization and poor educational skills, factors that might prevent individuals from participating in politics altogether, rather than supporting the extreme populist right, we use Heckman Probit Selection Models to explain the vote for these parties. In the first step, we use *political interest, income, education,* and *political support* to explain political participation. Our measure of political support combines assessments of support for the government and for democracy. Furthermore, we include *age* both in years, as well as in squared form, as participation is known to rise over the life-cycle, while then declining as individuals grow old. The coding of most of these variables is straightforward and does not require discussion. In terms of *education,* we use a distinction between low levels of education (elementary school and lower vocational training), medium levels (secondary education, vocational training) and higher education (undergraduate and graduate levels). Income, education, and satisfaction with democracy are also used to explain the vote for the extreme populist right.

Political preferences. To operationalize the *new cultural dimension,* we create indicators for the most important issues that have triggered the two transformations of political space since the 1960s. The concerns of the New Social Movements of the seventies and eighties are captured using five items pertaining to cultural liberalism (women's emancipation, rights of homosexuals, and the importance of authoritarian values in school and in criminal law). The issues relating to the second transformation are tapped using various items on immigration

and European integration. Furthermore, the factor analyses reveal that welfare state misuse and welfare chauvinism empirically load on the cultural, rather than the economic dimension. These categories are thus combined with the other cultural issues to form a single scale for the cultural dimension, again using factor analysis. *Economic preferences* are measured using indicators pertaining to redistribution, social insurance, and social investment. A detailed description of all items used to measure political preferences may be found in the Appendix.

Economic position. Apart from absolute *income,* which is measured using ten categories, we have constructed an indicator for relative deprivation. *Relative income* identifies those individuals within the working class whose income is below the median of their class within the specific country. *Job insecurity* is measured by a factor based on items referring to whether respondents have been unemployed in the past five years and to how likely people think it is that they will become unemployed in the next twelve months. Finally, we use *trade openness* to tap the competitiveness of respondents' economic sector. We use Bürgisser's (2011) country-specific measure of the trade exposure of the sector in which respondents work (imports and exports relative to GDP), using information on the 16 sectors listed in the ESS.

Working class culture and milieu. The variable *union membership* identifies all individuals who declare currently being union members, or to have been so in the past. Analyses separating current and past union membership yield similar results, and are thus not reported. *Working class family background* is measured using two items asking respondents what their father's and mother's occupation was when they were 14. The variable scores 1 for respondents with at least one working class parent and 0 for those with no working class background.

The Class Basis of the Extreme Populist Right Vote

We begin with three Heckman Probit selection models that explain electoral participation and the vote for an extreme right-wing populist party, including country dummies to account for country-specific factors in both steps (effects of the country dummies are omitted). The results are presented in Table 1. Starting with the factors that account for political participation, we see that, as expected, political interest, income, age and political support are related to participation in predictable ways. In terms of education, respondents with intermediate levels of education form the reference category, and those with low levels of education participate significantly less, while those with higher education vote significantly more than this group. In analyzing the vote for the extreme populist right, we follow the classical funnel of causality (Campbell et al. 1960), and introduce blocks of variables step-by-step.

<Table 1>

For the explanation of the vote for the extreme right, Model 1 includes only social class and income. While income has no effect, three classes stand out in terms of their propensity to vote for the extreme right: Both skilled and unskilled workers are over-represented in this electorate, while socio-cultural specialists are significantly under-represented. Contrary to what earlier analyses revealed, small business owners no longer form a core constituency of the extreme right, and neither do any of the other lower classes. The inclusion of education in Model 2 clearly attests to the negative effect of higher education on the vote for the extreme right. While low levels of education reduce the propensity of individuals to turn out to vote, they have no effect on support for the extreme right, however: No difference is revealed between individuals with low and medium levels of education. Interestingly, however,

introducing education into the model shows that the effects of class are not solely a function of education, as they are hardly reduced at all.

Thus, there is something specific to blue-collar working class occupations not captured by formal education that impinges on their propensity to vote for the extreme right. Given that we have hypothesized cultural attitudes to be rooted in education, introducing them in a final model might nonetheless help us explain the class effect. Model 3 introduces positions on the economic and cultural dimensions as well as political support. The cultural dimension, indeed, exerts the strongest influence. Its highly significant negative effect implies that less universalistic attitudes make the vote for the extreme right much more likely. Market-liberal preferences also have a positive significant effect, while political support reduces the likelihood of voting for the extreme right. While these findings conform to expectations, the most significant result, from our perspective, is that the manual working class's affinity to the extreme right is not entirely explained by cultural preferences, contrary to what we had expected. The same goes for the socio-cultural specialists' aversion against the populist right. While the class effects are less clear-cut in the final model, they remain significant at least at the 5 per cent level.

Note that, when controlling for attitudes, the effect of lower education becomes significantly negative. Thus, if attitudes are taken into account, voters with medium levels of education stand out for supporting the extreme right most frequently.This is a first indication of a finding that emerges even more clearly in the subsequent analyses: It is not the least sophisticated and most economically deprived individuals that vote for the extreme right. Most importantly, however, models 1 to 3 show that neither cultural worldviews, nor their educational antecedents are sufficient for explaining why the manual working class is over-represented in the extreme right's electorate

What Determines Voting for the Extreme Populist Right Within the Manual Working Class?

Given the roots the extreme populist right has formed in the working class, we now set out to determine whether some sub-segments of this class are particularly likely to support these parties. We thus restrict the sample to skilled production workers and routine operatives to study voting determinants *within* the manual working class. Table 2 shows the result of a Heckman Probit selection model explaining participation and extreme right vote choice. The most important result is that a number of prominent hypotheses concerning the impact of economic insecurity and marginalization are in fact not confirmed. Contrary to what is suggested by the economic modernization loser hypothesis, job insecurity and low education actually prevent individuals in the manual working class from participating, rather than making them vote for the extreme right. The same tends to be true for low income, but the effect is not significant. Our measure of relative deprivation (low income as compared to the mean of the working class) fails to reach significance. Age and political interest have the hypothesized positive effect on participation.

<Table 2>

Among working class individuals, few factors distinguish those voting for the extreme right from the others. By far the most powerful influence is exerted by anti-universalistic cultural preferences, while it is noteworthy that the extreme right does not attract working class voters who are particularly market liberal. Trade exposure has no effect, nor is there an effect of skilled production workers, or union members. All in all, it is safe to say that skilled workers and routine operatives voting for the extreme populist right stand out predominantly for their position along the cultural dimension of conflict. With the exception of gender,

working-class men having a higher propensity than women to vote for the extreme right, these preferences do not seem to be related in any clear way to social structural position. On the other hand, support for the government and for democracy tend to dampen support for the extreme right, and the same goes for religiosity.

Table 2 also provides evidence that working class families are not immune to the appeal of the extreme right. Although the effect of having working class parents is significant only at the 10 per cent level, it is positive. Another way of looking at the rootedness of the extreme right in the working class is by using multinomial regression to determine what distinguishes those supporting the extreme right from those voting for the mainstream left within the manual working class (see Table A1 in the Appendix). This analysis shows us whether and how extreme right voters differ from the classical left-wing segment. Interestingly, the comparison shows that the classical agents of socialization in the left-wing milieu, labor unions, only immunize the core of the manual working class from voting for the extreme right: Whereas skilled unionized workers are less likely to vote for the extreme right, no such effect is discernible for unionized routine operatives. The negative effect of age indicates that younger cohorts within the working class are less anchored in the left-wing milieu. Again, job insecurity has no influence, but workers in internationalized sectors are in fact more likely to vote for the extreme right, rather than the left. In terms of political preferences, extreme right voters are also somewhat more market liberal, while anti-universalistic values are again of overpowering significance.

These findings are particularly interesting when contrasted to the mainstream right. While the effect of sector is similar to that for the extreme right, market liberalism pushes workers to support the mainstream right much more clearly than the extreme right. Anti-universalistic attitudes also exert a significant influence on the mainstream right vote, but the effect is weaker than for the extreme right. Furthermore, center-right parties attract working class

voters who are cross-pressured by religion, while church attendance does not set left-wing and extreme right workers apart. Thus, together with what we found in the previous model, this indicates that both left-wing and extreme right working class voters tend to be secular. Non voters and those not professing any party preference, on the other hand, have political preferences that are to some degree similar to those of center-right and extreme right voters, but the effect of the cultural dimension is much stronger for the latter. Non voters are less politicized, and economically more marginal, however: they lack political interest, have low levels of education, and incomes below the median of the working class in their respective country.

Anti-Universalism and the Working Class in Countries Without Extreme Populist Right Parties

Given that the extreme right has broken into those segments of the working class that hold anti-universalistic preferences and rallies a particularly loyal following, as prior analyses have shown (Bornschier 2010a), the question arises which parties these segments vote for in countries that lack an extreme right-wing populist challenger. In a last set of analyses, we look at the party choice of working class individuals with outlooks similar to those prevalent in the extreme right electorate in Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Norway. In order to identify potential extreme right voters and simulate their behavior in the seven countries – Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, where parties of this type are not present, we must somehow take into account the context conditions that make for the differing levels of support for extreme right parties.

In the models above, these context conditions were captured by the country dummies (not shown in Tables 1 and 2 for reasons of space). The most favorable conditions for the extreme right are found in Switzerland, where the Swiss People's Party (SVP) faces little stigmatization due to its status as a long-established party, and due to the importance of the issue of European integration, which the SVP capitalizes on. We thus simulate a Swiss context to identify potential extreme right voters in the set of countries in which the extreme right failed to make a breakthrough. We do so by predicting the probability of voting for the extreme right, based on the parameters presented in Table 2, including the Swiss country dummy for the voters from the seven countries without an extreme right party. Based on these predictions, we distinguish working class voters with a high potential of voting for an extreme right party ($p>.5$) from those with a low potential of voting for such a party ($p<.5$). It turns out that, assuming the presence of a Swiss style extreme right party, no less than 63 per cent of the British working class has a high potential of voting for such a party. The corresponding shares for the other countries range from 57 per cent (Greece) and 43 per cent (Germany) to 28 (Spain), 25 (Sweden), 21 (Ireland) and a low of 11 per cent (Portugal).

Table 3 shows, for each of these seven countries, the vote choice of working-class individuals with a low and those with a high potential of voting for the extreme right, based on the characteristics that we know to push voters to support the Swiss People's Party in Switzerland. The results tend to convey an impressive message: In the absence of a party that matches their profile, the most obvious choice for workers is to abstain from voting. In general, more than a third of this group does not vote, with rates of abstention climbing to 45 per cent in Germany and 62 per cent in Portugal. It is also interesting to note that the mainstream right is unable to capitalize substantially on the anti-universalistic potential in the working class. As is shown by Table 3, all but the British and Greek parties of the mainstream right obtain lower shares among the workers with a high potential for the extreme right than among those with a low potential for supporting such a party. Given the popular hypothesis

that the mainstream right is able to close the political space to its right by taking tough stances on immigration, for example in the case of Germany (e.g., van der Brug et al. 2005), this is a remarkable finding. In Ireland, Sinn Fein receives over-proportional support from this group, on the other hand, in Sweden it is the Swedish Democrats who score rather well in this group, although, overall, they only received 3 per cent of the votes in the 2006 elections.

Conclusion

A voluminous literature has argued that extreme populist right parties thrive on the potential constituted by the economic and cultural processes of modernization of the past decades. Contrary to this assumption, we have shown that economic marginalization and job insecurity play no role in determining the vote for these parties. A first key finding of our analysis is that the worst-off in society in terms of education and class status do not vote at all, and thus constitute a political potential not seized by any party. Nor do highly educated voters find the extreme right's anti-universalistic and exclusionist message particularly appealing. The typical extreme right voter disposes of an intermediate level of education, belongs to the manual working class, and is not disinterested in politics. A second key finding is that it is cultural worldviews, over and above their educational antecedents, that play the most important role in determining the vote for these parties. Although extreme right voters constitute a sizable minority, and have their views politically represented by parties such as the Swiss and the Danish People's Parties or the French Front National, they distrust government and are not supportive of the way democracy works in their country.

Even controlling for political preferences and a host of other factors, the working class stands out for its support for the extreme right. How has the populist right achieved its status as the defender of the interests of this class? Our analysis shows that anti-universalism plays

the most important role in explaining why some members vote for the extreme right, while others do not. Within the working class, market liberal preferences play no role, and neither does job insecurity: culture clearly reigns supreme. While long considered a conservative force (Lipset 1960), our analysis shows that the classical agents of left-wing socialization in the blue-collar segment of society are weakening dramatically. Being the member of a labor union no longer immunizes workers from the appeal of the extreme right, and neither does coming from a working class family. Again, the most economically insecure segments of this class abstain from voting, rather than supporting the extreme right.

Cultural, not economic modernization losers support the extreme right. The only structural element shaping this worldview is gender. And indeed, the typical male blue-collar worker has most dramatically lost in terms of prestige with the advent of the service economy, as a consequence of the concomitant rise in female employment, as well as the gradual reform of welfare states centered on the single male breadwinner, and more equitable gender roles. The extreme populist right's traditionalist-communitarian ideology provides a dual remedy for this uncertainty. Not only do these movements champion the return to the orderly, culturally conservative society characteristic of the post-war decades. In their demarcation from immigrants, they also contribute to an upgrading of this group's self-consciousness. It is a well-known fact from social-psychology that the construction of boundaries between in-groups and out-groups enhances individuals' self-esteem (Tajfel 1981, Monroe et al. 2000, Burke 2004).

Although we can thus partly explain the extreme right's appeal within the working class, we are left with the puzzle that these parties have not been successful throughout Western Europe. Our analysis clearly shows that this cannot be explained by differences in the size of country-specific potentials. While the anti-universalistic segment within the working class is small in Sweden, Portugal, and Ireland, it is sizable in the UK, Germany, and Spain – despite

the fact that right-wing populist parties have not been successful in any of these countries. Rather than being rallied by the established parties, many voters that could be expected to support an extreme right party if the option were available chose to simply not vote. The only exception in this respect is the UK. Both in the UK and in Sweden, the left has avoided dividing the working class electorate, possibly due to its lukewarm defense of universalistic values. Nonetheless, levels of abstention are high even in Sweden, as in many of the countries that lack an extreme right party, because the mainstream right is unable to rally the anti-universalistic potential. Were it not for the presence of the extreme populist right in various West European countries, then, our analysis would second Goldthorpe's (2002) hunch that the tensions produced by economic modernization and globalization do not necessarily result in a revival of class voting, but rather in a strengthening of the relationship between class and political participation.

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Table 1: Probit selection model explaining participation and the vote for the extreme populist right (table shows coefficients and z-values)

Vote for the extreme populist right

	Model 1 b/z	Model 2 b/z	Model 3 b/z
Income	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	-1.30	-0.45	0.86
Self-employed	-0.08	-0.02	-0.08
	-0.66	-0.19	-0.58
Small business owners	0.05	-0.02	-0.12
	0.61	-0.32	-1.52
Office clerks	0.11	0.02	0.00
	1.35	0.30	0.01
Technical professionals	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05
	-0.51	-0.48	-0.50
Socio-cultural specialists	-0.39***	-0.32***	-0.25**
	-4.73	-3.76	-2.70
Service workers	0.11	0.01	-0.02
	1.52	0.18	-0.21
Skilled production workers	0.44***	0.32***	0.19*
	6.01	4.09	2.30
Routine operatives	0.34***	0.25**	0.23**
	4.66	3.15	2.69
Low education		-0.07	-0.24***
		-1.15	-3.66
High education		-0.34***	-0.20***
		-5.89	-3.31
Economic dimension			0.11***
			3.44
Cultural dimension			-0.58***
			-17.30
Political support			-0.10***
			-3.64
Constant	-1.36***	-1.25***	-1.57***
	-14.74	-12.87	-14.82

Continued on next page

Political Participation			
Political interest	0.33***	0.33***	0.32***
	15.76	15.80	15.49
Income	0.02**	0.02**	0.02***
	2.92	3.07	3.33
Age	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	21.44	21.45	21.38
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	-15.99	-15.99	-15.85
Low education	-0.36***	-0.37***	-0.37***
	-8.67	-8.84	-8.94
High education	0.35***	0.32***	0.33***
	8.17	7.64	7.70
Support for democracy	0.13***	0.13***	0.11***
	6.60	6.52	5.64
Constant	-2.23***	-2.23***	-2.24***
	-17.51	-17.53	-17.58
Athrho	0.70***	0.61***	0.54***
	4.17	3.89	3.52
Rho	0.60	0.54	0.49
N	10404	10404	10392
Censored observations	1904	1904	1904
Uncensored observations	8500	8500	8488

Note: Effect of country dummies not shown. Log likelihood of comparison between Probit and selection models indicates that selection model is appropriate.
Significance levels: # $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .0.1$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 2: Probit selection model explaining participation and vote within the manual working class (table shows coefficients and z-values)

	Participation	Extreme right vote
Gender	0.02	-0.25*
	0.29	-2.20
Age	0.10***	-0.00
	10.11	-0.96
Age squared	-0.00***	
	-7.42	
Income	0.03#	0.03
	1.88	0.83
Relative income		0.05
		0.32
Political interest	0.32***	
	7.38	
Job insecurity	-0.12***	0.03
	-3.29	0.48
Low education	-0.35***	-0.19
	-4.4	-1.18
High education	0.15	-0.19
	0.92	-0.83
Political support	0.04	-0.09#
	0.95	-1.76
Skilled worker		0.29
		0.77
Union member		0.09
		0.61
Skilled x union		-0.31
		-1.58
Working-class family		0.24#
		1.86
Skilled x w-family		0.11
		0.58
Trade exposure		0.01
		0.64
Church attendence		-0.07#
		-1.83
Economic dimension		0.05
		0.69
Cultural dimension		-0.60***
		-8.54
Constant	-2.17***	-1.10*
	-7.05	-2.03
Athrho	0.03	
	0.11	
N	2020	
Censored observations	503	
Uncensored observations	1517	

Note: Effects of country dummies not shown
Significance levels: # p ≤ .10 * p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .0.1 *** p ≤ .001

Table 3: Real vote of workers who have a low and a high potential for voting in favour of the extreme populist right, for countries without an extreme populist right

	Britain		Germany		Greece		Ireland		Portugal		Spain		Sweden	
Vote	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high
Left	46.6	42.3	38.3	29.5	42.1	43.6	9.7	7.0	38.9	31.0	39.4	37.4	50.2	44.2
Right	14.7	17.1	29.9	23.8	22.7	26.7	59.5	42.1	10.8	7.1	20.3	17.1	23.3	17.4
Others/ethnic	4.0	3.3	.3	1.3	4.0	4.0	7.8	**17.5**	0.6	0.0	7.8	**3.3**	2.0	**11.6**
Non-voter	34.7	**36.9**	31.5	**45.4**	30.3	25.7	23.0	**33.3**	49.7	**61.9**	32.5	**42.3**	24.5	**26.7**
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	150	222	490	132	76	101	217	57	324	42	320	123	253	86
	G=.07		G=.22**		G=-.06		G=.28*		G=.25		G=.10*		G=.12***	

Table A1: Multinomial logit model explaining participation and vote for the mainstream right, the extreme populist right, and lack of party preferences, as opposed to the mainstream left within the manual working class (table shows coefficients and z-values)

Times	Mainstream right b/z	Extreme right b/z	No vote or preference b/z
Age	-0.01**	-0.02**	-0.05***
	-2.63	-3.16	-10.74
Gender	-0.14	-0.55*	-0.07
	-0.86	-2.5	-0.45
Income	0.08	0.07	0.02
	1.39	0.93	0.37
Relative income	0.35	0.31	0.48*
	1.35	0.98	1.96
Skilled worker	0.55	1.21	0.67
	0.89	1.61	1.18
Union member	-0.42*	-0.02	-0.35#
	-1.96	-0.07	-1.7
Skilled x union	-0.39	-0.95*	-0.47
	-1.23	-2.43	-1.57
Working-class family	-0.31	0.32	-0.18
	-1.62	1.25	-0.98
Skilled x w-family	0.38	0.45	0.63*
	1.29	1.2	2.25
Trade openness	0.14*	0.13*	0.13*
	2.23	2.07	2.02
Job insecurity	-0.06	0.01	0.02
	-0.67	0.1	0.28
Church attendance	0.32***	0.04	0.06
	5.45	0.51	0.96
Low education	0.17	-0.21	0.74**
	0.67	-0.67	3.13
High education	0.38	-0.06	0.05
	1.13	-0.13	0.15
Economic dimension	0.50***	0.31*	0.31**
	4.44	2.23	2.86
Cultural dimension	-0.35**	-1.21***	-0.33**
	-3.17	-8.45	-3.12
Political support	0.12	-0.23*	-0.09
	1.32	-2.17	-1.06
Political interest	0.06	0.01	-0.61***
	0.65	0.06	-6.85
Constant	0.39	-0.31	3.26***
	0.5	-0.3	4.42
N		2031	

Reference category: Mainstream left (excluding extreme left and Green parties)
Note: Effect of country dummies not shown
Significance levels: # $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .0.1$ *** $p \leq .001$

Appendix: Survey items used for the construction of issue-categories and dimensions

Item	Description	Issue-category	Dimension
wmcpwrk	Woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of their family	Cultural liberalism	Cultural dimension
mnrgtjb	Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce		
freehms	Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish		
schtaut	Schools must teach children to obey authority		
hrshsnt	People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days		
imsmetn	Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	Immigration	
imdfetn	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority		
impcntr	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe		
imbgeco	Immigration bad or good for country's economy		
imwbcn	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live		
euftf	European Union: European unification should go further or has gone too far	Supra-national governance	
trstep	Trust in the European Parliament		
trstun	Trust in the United Nations		
uentrjb	Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job	Welfare abuse	
bennent	Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to		
prtsick	Employees often pretend they are sick to stay at home		
imrccon	Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute to social security	Welfare chauvinism	
gvjbevn	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Jobs for everyone	Government responsibility	Economic dimension
gvhlthc	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Health care for the sick		
gvcldcr	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Child care services for working parents		
gvpdlwk	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Paid leave from work to care for sick family		
gvslvol	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Standard of living for the old		
gvslvue	Government's responsibility (scale 1-10): Maintain standard of living for the unemployed		
dfincac	Large differences in income should be acceptable to reward talents and efforts	Income differences	
gincdif	Government should reduce differences in income levels	Redistribution	
smdfslv	For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small	Egalitarianism	

Imputations:

- Immigration, cultural liberalism, welfare abuse: constructed by factor analyses for the entire file, based on corresponding original ESS variables; missing variables on the original variables have been imputed based on the other original variables of the respective set.
- Welfare chauvinism, supra-national governance, government responsibility, redistribution: transformed original variables; missing values on the original variables have been imputed based on related variables.